Toscano first contends that the State failed to prove either second degree assault because it did not prove that Ms. 714, 718, 995 P.2d 107 (2000).¶ 9 Second degree assault means to “assault[ ] another with a deadly weapon.” RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). This is the definition of assault at issue here.¶ 10 Assault requires specific intent to create the apprehension of harm. Though such behavior is certainly reprehensible, it does not rise to the level of intimidation.
Sufficient Evidence—Second Degree Assault Charge¶ 7 Ms. “When a statute is unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial construction and its meaning must be derived from the plain language of the statute alone.” Id. A statute's meaning is a question of law and our review is therefore de novo. Toscano's essential argument is that her nonverbal conduct could not have been a threat. Stephenson to argue that she did not threaten the officer because she never made a “verbal statement.” 89 Wash. But the State cannot bring an intimidation charge any time a defendant insults or threatens a public servant.
Deputy Voss saw Michael Castoreno commit a traffic infraction and he turned on his emergency lights to stop him.
Severability -- 1996 c 302: See note following RCW 9A.42.010. Findings and intent -- Short title -- Severability -- Captions not law -- 1995 c 129: See notes following RCW . Index, part headings not law -- Severability -- Effective dates -- Application -- 1990 c 3: See RCW 18.155.900 through 18.155.902. Application -- 1989 c 271 §§ 101-111: See note following RCW .
Application -- 1989 c 99: "This act applies to crimes committed after July 1, 1989." [1989 c 99 § 2.] Effective date -- 1989 c 99: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, the support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and shall take effect July 1, 1989." [1989 c 99 § 3.] Effective date -- Savings -- Application -- 1988 c 145: See notes following RCW 9A.44.010.
Susan Marie Gasch, Gasch Law Office, Spokane, WA, for Appellant. Nor do the facts here implicate fair and independent decision-making or corruption by Deputy Voss.¶ 25 Ms.
Carole Louise Highland, Attorney at Law, Ephrata, WA, for Respondent. Toscano drove left toward the middle of the street and toward Deputy Voss; she refused to yield the right of way to him. He had a couple seconds to react on the gravel road.¶ 3 Deputy Voss encountered Ms. Toscano's conduct also strikes us as more akin to a display of anger (Montano and Burke ) than an attempt to influence. Toscano assaulted this officer and she attempted to block his path. It seems to us that, if physically confronting an officer and yelling threats at him is not enough to show an attempt to influence, then a physical confrontation without threats is also not enough.¶ 26 We reverse the conviction for intimidating a public servant and affirm the convictions for assault.¶ 27 I concur with the majority except for its holding that the facts do not support the conviction of intimidating a public servant.
A jury found her guilty of each charge except for the malicious mischief. Toscano appeals and challenges both of her second degree assault convictions, and the intimidating a public servant conviction. Toscano relies on Bland to argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Deputy Voss feared harm. Former RCW 9A.04.110(27)(j).¶ 18 We interpret statutes to carry out the legislative purpose. Sullivan, 143 Wash.2d 162, 174–75, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001). M., 144 Wash.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001).¶ 19 Ms. Castoreno, but wanting a particular result is not communication. In Montano, the court explained that treating a police officer inappropriately does not always amount to intimidating a public servant: The evidence arguably shows that Montano resisted arrest, and charging him with that crime is appropriate.
Toscano with intimidating a public servant, second degree malicious mischief (for an incident that occurred after the pursuit), attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, and two counts of second degree assault—one for each encounter with Deputy Voss during the pursuit.¶ 5 The court instructed the jury on the elements of intimidating a public servant and defined the relevant terms for the jury. We conclude that a jury could have inferred the necessary intent from the State's showing here. Toscano first turned her car into the middle of a gravel road and toward Deputy Voss's patrol car and refused to yield. Toscano then “darted” into the intersection with her high beams on “like she was going to hit” Deputy Voss. The jury could have inferred that she drove in this manner because it was likely to cause a crash and would certainly make Deputy Voss afraid of crashing.¶ 11 Ms. Former RCW 9A.04.110(27)(b).• To do any other act which is intended to harm substantially the person threatened or another with respect to his health, safety, business, financial condition, or personal relationship. There the defendant sent threatening letters to superior court judges. In context, her actions suggest that she wanted to hurt Deputy Voss or interrupt his chase of Mr. Toscano's actions are not clear nonverbal communication. And third, by deterring the intimidation and threats that lead to corrupt decision making, it helps maintain public confidence in democratic institutions. Montano, 169 Wash.2d at 879, 239 P.3d 360 (reversing conviction for intimidating a public servant arising out of breaking free from an arresting officer, grabbing him, and threatening to beat him up); see Burke, 132 Wash. at 421–22, 132 P.3d 1095 (holding that “physical attack,” yelling profanities, and making “fighting threats” were not enough to prove intent to influence a police officer who was shutting down a house party).
Effective date -- Application -- 1987 c 224: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, the support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and shall take effect on July 1, 1987.
It shall apply to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1987." [1987 c 224 § 2.] Severability -- 1986 c 257: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.
Severability -- 2000 c 225: See note following RCW .
Effective date -- 2000 c 119 § 17: "Section 17 of this act takes effect July 1, 2000." [2000 c 119 § 30.] Application -- 2000 c 119: See note following RCW .
The defendant did not appeal the attempting to elude conviction.